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X-4115

12 March 1946

TO: SAINT, AUSTRIA, AMZON, ROME

FROM: SAINT

SUBJECT: NKGP Recruiting of Jewish Agents for Palestine

1. Reference is made to Vern 1817 and to a memorandum on NKGP efforts to send Jewish agents to Palestine. Copies of each are attached for Germany and Italy and the latter for Austria.

2. It is believed that Germany, Austria and Italy should attempt to penetrate this activity. A suggested plan for penetration is outlined herein for your consideration.

3. The person picked for the penetration should have the following qualifications:

(a) Be Jewish

(b) Be a Refugee or displaced person if possible.

(c) Be not previously connected with Communist Party activities or anti-Communist activities. In other words, someone who in the past has never engaged in activities which would make the Russians suspicious of him and at the same time, one from whom we could have reasonable grounds not to fear a double-cross.

(d) Be willing to go to Palestine on long range penetration program and with no current ties that would make his interest in going to Palestine suspicious.

(e) Be intelligent enough to be able to give us reports on his activities and the activities of those with whom he is in contact.

4. The selection of such a person should be carefully made and will likely take some considerable time.

5. In the meantime through other agents, the extent of Russian activity along these lines should be ascertained if possible.

6. The prospective agent should join the Communist Party in the city where the recruiting is going on and through careful coaching by you indicate a substantial interest in Communism and particularly Russia. He should react favorably to all issues in which the Party is interested locally. You

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can no doubt advise him what these issues are and how to react, whether he believes that way or not. This is essential as the agent, if properly picked, will not be a Communist and will not normally react in such a way as to be accepted in the party and gain their confidence.

7. After a month or two he should start mentioning casually that his position in Austria is not secure, etc., and that he would like to go to Palestine. He should also express anti-British feelings.

8. There is little doubt that if there is such a movement the agent will be recruited, since to them, he would normally fall into the type of person they are sending to Palestine.

9. This NKGB propaganda activity in Palestine is not so important as the learning of their routes, agents in Germany, Austria, Italy and Palestine, contacts, hideouts, financing, forgery of documents and general modus operandi. The capable agents recruited by the NKGB will no doubt be given tasks other than propaganda activity. If our agent is recruited, we will have detail information on this activity plus an agent in Palestine who will be more or less entrenched with the Russians. For his protection in Palestine, we can if necessary, advise the British of his existence, if not of his name. That, however, can be decided according to the development of the operation.

10. The agent should be advised to participate fully in Communist activities in Austria, short of violence. There you can closely supervise him to keep him out of trouble.

11. If he is not recruited for the Palestine project, we will still have a good agent in the Communist Party who will probably come into contact with Russian Intelligence activities and possibly be recruited for such activities. We know from repeated experience throughout the world that the party is used for Russian Intelligence purposes.

12. You might also give consideration to so placing other such individuals in the Communist Party in other cities who will have qualifications 3 and 5. This type of penetration offers a certain disadvantage: namely, that the agent will have had no previous intelligence training and experience, thus making more work for you. It offers, however, a distinct advantage: more trust in the agent by ourselves and less suspicion on the part of the Russians since he is politically clean and has nothing to explain away to them.

13. The plan outlined above has been successfully

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worked in many instances. It offers one minor hazard which can be overcome by frequent briefings. The person so selected should be the type of person the party is currently recruiting if any preference is being made at this time. The propaganda of the party is directed at this type of person and is frequently very persuasive. There sometimes is a tendency on the part of the agent to become influenced by this propaganda. Frequent orientation will, however, overcome this tendency, which will usually last only for the first month or two until the agent gets a more complete understanding of the party, its actual aims and purposes.

14. Your views on this project are requested, together with evaluation of the information in the attached memorandum. When the project is initiated, you should keep Washington closely advised of all developments in order that the penetration may be carefully coordinated.

15. In connection with the Russian-Palestine penetration plan outlined herein, the study entitled "Security Aspects of the Zionist Movement" which has been forwarded to you should be considered both as to security of your operation and as to the possibility of your operation securing information concerning this type of activity. There has been some information that Russia has indicated sympathy and moral support to both the Zionist movement in Palestine and the Arab position in order to be able to exploit either side that may become disgruntled as a result of any final decision of the Palestine matter.

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